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Introduction 
 
Few dispute that digital technology is fundamentally changing the 
way in which we engage in the research process. Indeed, it is 
becoming more and more evident that research is increasingly being 
mediated through digital technology. Many argue that this 
mediation is slowly beginning to change what it means to undertake 
research, affecting both the epistemologies and ontologies that 
underlie a research programme. Of course, this development is 
variable depending on disciplines and research agendas, with some 
more reliant on digital technology than others, but it is rare to find 
an academic today who has had no access to digital technology as 
part of their research activity. Library catalogues are now probably 
the minimum way in which an academic can access books and 
research articles without the use of a computer, but, with card 
indexes dying a slow and certain death (Baker, 1996, 2001), there 
remain few outputs for the non-digital scholar to undertake research 
in the modern university. Email, Google searches and bibliographic 
databases are become increasingly crucial, as more of the world 
libraries are scanned and placed online. Whilst some decry the loss 
of the skills and techniques of older research traditions, others have 
warmly embraced what has come to be called the digital humanities 
(Schreibman et al., 2008; Schnapp & Presner, 2009; Presner, 2010; 
Hayles, 2011). 
  
The digital humanities try to take account of the plasticity of digital 
forms and the way in which they point toward a new way of working 
with representation and mediation, what might be called the digital 
‘folding’ of reality, whereby one is able to approach culture in a 
radically new way. To mediate an object, a digital or computational 
device requires that this object be translated into the digital code 
that it can understand. This minimal transformation is effected 
 
BERRY ??COMPUTATIONAL TURN                                                      CM 12 ? 2011 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net ??2  
through the input mechanism of a socio-technical device within 
which a model or image is stabilised and attended to. It is then 
internally transformed, depending on a number of interventions, 
processes or filters, and eventually displayed as a final calculation, 
usually in a visual form. This results in real-world situations where 
computation is event-driven and divided into discrete processes to 
undertake a particular user task. The key point is that without the 
possibility of discrete encoding there is no object for the 
computational device to process. However, in cutting up the world 
in this manner, information about the world necessarily has to be 
discarded in order to store a representation within the computer. In 
other words, a computer requires that everything is transformed 
from the continuous flow of our everyday reality into a grid of 
numbers that can be stored as a representation of reality which can 
then be manipulated using algorithms. These subtractive methods of 
understanding reality (episteme) produce new knowledges and 
methods for the control of reality (techne). They do so through a 
digital mediation, which the digital humanities are starting to take 
seriously as their problematic.  
 
The digital humanities themselves have had a rather interesting 
history. Starting out as ‘computing in the humanities’, or ‘humanities 
computing’, in the early days they were often seen as a technical 
support to the work of the ‘real’ humanities scholars, who would 
drive the projects. This involved the application of the computer to 
the disciplines of the humanities, something that has been described 
as treating the ‘machine’s efficiency as a servant’ rather than ‘its 
participant enabling of criticism’ (McCarty, 2009). As Hayles 
explains, changing to the term ‘“Digital Humanities” was meant to 
signal that the field had emerged from the low-prestige status of a 
support service into a genuinely intellectual endeavour with its own 
professional practices, rigorous standards, and exciting theoretical 
explorations’ (Hayles, 2011). Ironically, as the projects became 
bigger and more complex, and as it developed computational 
techniques as an intrinsic part of the research process, technically 
proficient researchers increasingly saw the computational as part 
and parcel of what it meant to do research in the humanities itself. 
That is, computational technology has become the very condition of 
possibility required in order to think about many of the questions 
raised in the humanities today. For example, as Schnapp and Presner 
explain in the Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0,  
 
The first wave of digital humanities work was 
quantitative, mobilizing the search and retrieval 
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powers of the database, automating corpus 
linguistics, stacking hypercards into critical arrays. 
The second wave is qualitative, interpretive, 
experiential, emotive, generative in character. It 
harnesses digital toolkits in the service of the 
Humanities’ core methodological strengths: 
attention to complexity, medium specificity, 
historical context, analytical depth, critique and 
interpretation. (2009, original emphasis) 
 
Presner argues further that  
 
the first wave of Digital Humanities scholarship in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s tended to focus on 
large-scale digitization projects and the 
establishment of technological infrastructure, 
[while] the current second wave of Digital 
Humanities -- what can be called ‘Digital 
Humanities 2.0’ -- is deeply generative, creating 
the environments and tools for producing, 
curating, and interacting with knowledge that is 
‘born digital’ and lives in various digital contexts. 
While the first wave of Digital Humanities 
concentrated, perhaps somewhat narrowly, on 
text analysis (such as classification systems, mark-
up, text encoding, and scholarly editing) within 
established disciplines, Digital Humanities 2.0 
introduces entirely new disciplinary paradigms, 
convergent fields, hybrid methodologies, and 
even new publication models that are often not 
derived from or limited to print culture. (2010: 6)  
 
The question of quite how the digital humanities undertake their 
research, and whether the notions of first and second wave digital 
humanities captures the current state of different working practices 
and methods in the digital humanities, remains contested. Yet these 
can be useful analytical concepts for thinking through the changes in 
the digital humanities. We might, however, observe the following: 
first-wave digital humanities involved the building of infrastructure 
in the studying of humanities texts through digital repositories, text 
markup, etc., whereas second-wave digital humanities expands the 
notional limits of the archive to include digital works, and so bring to 
bear the humanities’ own methodological toolkits to look at ‘born-
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digital’ materials, such as electronic literature (e-lit), interactive 
fiction (IF), web-based artefacts, and so forth.  
 
I would like to explore here a tentative path for a third wave of the 
digital humanities, concentrated around the underlying 
computationality of the forms held within a computational medium. 
That is, I propose to look at the digital component of the digital 
humanities in the light of its medium specificity, as a way of thinking 
about how medial changes produce epistemic changes. This 
approach draws from recent work in software studies and critical 
code studies, but it also thinks about the questions raised by 
platform studies, namely the specifics of general computability made 
available by specific platforms (Fuller, 2008; Manovich, 2008; 
Montfort & Bogost, 2009; Berry, 2011). I also want to suggest that 
neither first nor second-wave digital humanities really 
problematized what Lakatos (1980) would have called the ‘hard-
core’ of the humanities, the unspoken assumptions and ontological 
foundations which support the ‘normal’ research that humanities 
scholars undertake on an everyday basis. Indeed, we could say that 
third-wave digital humanities points the way in which digital 
technology highlights the anomalies generated in a humanities 
research project and which leads to the questioning of the 
assumptions implicit in such research, e.g. close reading, canon 
formation, periodization, liberal humanism, etc. We are, as Presner 
argues, ‘at the beginning of a shift in standards governing 
permissible problems, concepts, and explanations, and also in the 
midst of a transformation of the institutional and conceptual 
conditions of possibility for the generation, transmission, 
accessibility, and preservation of knowledge’ (2010: 10). 
 
To look into this issue, I want to start with an examination of the 
complex field of understanding culture through digital technology. 
Indeed, I argue that to understand the contemporary born-digital 
culture and the everyday practices that populate it – the focus of a 
digital humanities second wave – we need a corresponding focus on 
the computer code that is entangled with all aspects of our lives, 
including reflexivity about how much code is infiltrating the 
academy itself. As Mathew Fuller argues, ‘in a sense, all intellectual 
work is now “software study”, in that software provides its media and 
its context… [yet] there are very few places where the specific 
nature, the materiality, of software is studied except as a matter of 
engineering’ (2006). We also need to bring to the fore the ‘structure 
of feeling’ that computer code facilitates and the way in which 
people use software in their research thinking and everyday 
 
BERRY ??COMPUTATIONAL TURN                                                      CM 12 ? 2011 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net ??5  
practices. This includes the increase in the acceptance and use of 
software in the production, consumption and critique of culture.  
 
Thus, there is an undeniable cultural dimension to computation and 
the medial affordances of software. This connection again points to 
the importance of engaging with and understanding code: indeed, 
computer code can serve as an index of digital culture (imagine 
digital humanities mapping different programming languages to the 
cultural possibilities and practices that it affords, e.g. HTML to 
cyberculture, AJAX to social media).1 This means that we can ask 
the question: what is culture after it has been ‘softwarized’? 
(Manovich, 2008:41). Understanding digital humanities is in some 
sense then understanding code, and this can be a resourceful way of 
understanding cultural production more generally: for example, just 
as digital typesetting transformed the print newspaper industry, 
eBook and eInk technologies are likely to do so again. We thus need 
to take computation as the key issue that is underlying these changes 
across mediums, industries and economies. 
 
 
Knowing knowledge 
 
In trying to understand the digital humanities our first step might be 
to problematize computationality, so that we are able to think 
critically about how knowledge in the 21st century is transformed 
into information through computational techniques, particularly 
within software. It is interesting that at a time when the idea of the 
university is itself under serious rethinking and renegotiation, digital 
technologies are transforming our ability to use and understand 
information outside of these traditional knowledge structures. This 
is connected to wider challenges to the traditional narratives that 
served as unifying ideas for the university and, with their decline, has 
led to difficulty in justifying and legitimating the postmodern 
university vis-à-vis government funding.   
 
Historically, the role of the university has been closely associated 
with the production of knowledge. For example, in 1798 Immanuel 
Kant outlined an argument for the nature of the university titled The 
Conflict of the Faculties. He argued that all of the university’s 
activities should be organised by a single regulatory idea, that of the 
concept of reason. As Bill Readings (1996) stated: 
 
Reason on the one hand, provide[d] the ratio for 
all the disciplines; it [was] their organizing 
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principle. On the other hand, reason [had] its 
own faculty, which Kant names[d] ‘philosophy’ 
but which we would now be more likely to call the 
‘humanities’. (Readings, 1996: 15) 
 
Kant argued that reason and the state, knowledge and power, could 
be unified in the university by the production of individuals who 
would capable of rational thought and republican politics – students 
trained for the civil service and society. Kant was concerned with the 
question of regulative public reason, that is, with how to ensure 
stable, governed and governable regimes which can rule free people, 
in contrast to tradition represented by monarchy, the Church or a 
Leviathan. This required universities, as regulated knowledge-
producing organisations, to be guided and overseen by the faculty of 
philosophy, which could ensure that the university remained 
rational. This was part of a response to the rise of print culture, 
growing literacy and the kinds of destabilising effects that this 
brought. Thus, without resorting to dogmatic doctrinal force or 
violence, one could have a form of perpetual peace by the 
application of one’s reason.2  
 
This was followed by the development of the modern university in 
the 19th century, instituted by the German Idealists, such as Schiller 
and Humboldt, who argued that there should be a more explicitly 
political role to the structure given by Kant. They argued for the 
replacement of reason with culture, as they believed that culture 
could serve as a ‘unifying function for the university’ (Readings, 
1996: 15). For the German Idealists like Humboldt, culture was the 
sum of all knowledge that is studied, as well as the cultivation and 
development of one’s character as a result of that study. Indeed, 
Humboldt proposed the founding of a new university, the 
University of Berlin, as a mediator between national culture and the 
nation-state. Under the project of ‘culture’, the university would be 
required to undertake both research and teaching, i.e., the 
production and dissemination of knowledge respectively. The 
modern idea of a university therefore allowed it to become the 
preeminent institution that unified ethnic tradition and statist 
rationality by the production of an educated cultured individual. 
The German Idealists proposed 
 
that the way to reintegrate the multiplicity of 
known facts into a unified cultural science is 
through Bildung, the ennoblement of character… 
The university produces not servants but subjects. 
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That is the point of the pedagogy of Bildung, 
which teaches knowledge acquisition as a process 
rather than the acquisition of knowledge as a 
product. (Reading, 1996: 65-67) 
 
This notion was given a literary turn by the English, in particular 
John Henry Newman and Mathew Arnold, who argued that 
literature, not culture or philosophy, should be the central discipline 
in the university, and also in national culture more generally.3 
Literature therefore became institutionalised within the university 
‘in explicitly national terms and [through] an organic vision of the 
possibility of a unified national culture’ (Readings, 1996: 16). This 
became regulated through the notion of a literary canon, which was 
taught to students to produce literary subjects as national subjects.  
 
Readings argues that in the postmodern university we now see the 
breakdown of these ideals, associated particularly with the rise of the 
notion of the ‘university of excellence’ -- which for him is a concept 
of the university that has no content, no referent. What I would like 
to suggest is that today, we are beginning to see instead the cultural 
importance of the digital as the unifying idea of the university. 
Initially this has tended to be associated with notions such as 
information literacy and digital literacy, betraying their debt to the 
previous literary conception of the university, albeit understood 
through vocational training and employment. However, I want to 
propose that, rather than learning a practice for the digital, which 
tends to be conceptualised in terms of ICT skills and competences 
(see for example the European Computer Driving License4), we 
should be thinking about what reading and writing actually should 
mean in a computational age. This is to argue for critical 
understanding of the literature of the digital, and through that 
develop a shared digital culture through a form of digital Bildung. 
Here I am not calling for a return to the humanities of the past, to 
use a phrase of Fuller (2010), ‘for some humans’, but rather to a 
liberal arts that is ‘for all humans’. To use the distinction introduced 
by Hofstadter (1963), this is to call for the development of a digital 
intellect -- as opposed to a digital intelligence. Hofstadter writes: 
 
Intellect… is the critical, creative, and 
contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence 
seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, 
intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, 
criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the 
immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it. 
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Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for the 
meanings of situations as a whole… Intellect [is] 
a unique manifestation of human dignity. 
(Hofstadter, 1963: 25) 
 
The digital assemblages that are now being built not only promise 
great change at the level of the individual human actor. They 
provide destabilising amounts of knowledge and information that 
lack the regulating force of philosophy -- which, Kant argued, 
ensures that institutions remain rational. Technology enables access 
to the databanks of human knowledge from anywhere, disregarding 
and bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of knowledge in the state, 
the universities and the market. There no longer seems to be the 
professor who tells you what you should be looking up and the 
‘three arguments in favour of it’ and the ‘three arguments against it’. 
This introduces not only a moment of societal disorientation, with 
individuals and institutions flooded with information, but also offers 
a computational solution to this state of events in the form of 
computational rationalities--something that Turing (1950) 
described as super-critical modes of thought. Both of these forces 
are underpinned at a deep structural level by the conditions of 
possibility suggested by computer code. 
 
As mentioned previously, computer code enables new 
communicative processes, and with the increasing social dimension 
of networked media the possibility of new and exciting forms of 
collaborative thinking arises. This is not the collective intelligence 
discussed by Levy (1999); rather, it is the promise of a collective 
intellect. The situation is reminiscent of the medieval notion of the 
universitatis, but recast in a digital form, as a society or association of 
actors who can think critically together, mediated through 
technology. It further raises the question of what new modes of 
collective knowledge software can enable or constitute. Can 
software and code take us beyond the individualising trends of blogs, 
comments, twitter feeds, and so forth, and make possible something 
truly collaborative -- something like the super-critical thinking that is 
generative of ideas, modes of thought, theories and new practices? 
There is certainly something interesting about real-time stream 
forms of digital memory in that they are not afforded towards the 
past, as history, but neither are they directed towards a form of 
futurity. Instead we might say they seem to now-mediate? new-
mediate? life-mediate? Jetztzeit-mediate (Benjamin, 1992: 252-3)? 
In other words, they gather together the newness of a particular 
group of streams, a kind of collective writing, that has the potential 
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to be immensely creative. These are possible rich areas for research 
for a third-wave digital humanities that seeks to understand these 
potentially new forms of literature and the medium that supports 
them.  
 
For the research and teaching disciplines within the university, the 
digital shift could represent the beginnings of a moment of 
‘revolutionary science’, in the Kuhnian sense of a shift in the 
ontology of the positive sciences and the emergence of a 
constellation of new ‘normal science’ (Kuhn 1996). This would 
mean that the disciplines would, ontologically, have a very similar 
Lakatosian computational ‘hard core’ (Lakatos, 1980).5 This has 
much wider consequences for the notion of the unification of 
knowledge and the idea of the university (Readings, 1996). 
Computer science could play a foundational role with respect to the 
other sciences, supporting and directing their development, even 
issuing ‘lucid directives for their inquiry’.6 Perhaps we are beginning 
to see reading and writing computer code as part of the pedagogy 
required to create a new subject produced by the university, a 
computational or data-centric subject.7 This is, of course, not to 
advocate that the existing methods and practices of computer 
science become hegemonic, rather that a humanistic understanding 
of technology could be developed, which also involves an urgent 
inquiry into what is human about the computational humanities or 
social sciences. In a related manner, Fuller (Fuller, S., 2006) has 
called for a ‘new sociological imagination’, pointing to the historical 
project of the social sciences that have been committed to ‘all and 
only humans’, because they ‘take all human beings to be of equal 
epistemic interest and moral concern’ (Fuller, 2010: 242). By 
drawing attention to ‘humanity’s ontological precariousness’ (244), 
Fuller rightly identifies that the project of humanity requires urgent 
thought, and, we might add, even more so in relation to the 
challenge of a computationality that threatens our understanding of 
what is required to be identified as human at all.  
 
If software and code become the condition of possibility for unifying 
the multiple knowledges now produced in the university, then the 
ability to think oneself, taught by rote learning of methods, 
calculation, equations, readings, canons, processes, etc., might 
become less important. Although there might be less need for an 
individual ability to perform these mental feats or, perhaps, even 
recall the entire canon ourselves due to its size and scope, using 
technical devices, in conjunction with collaborative methods of 
working and studying, would enable a cognitively supported method 
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instead. The internalisation of particular practices that have been 
instilled for hundreds of years in children and students would need 
to be rethought, and in doing so the commonality of thinking qua 
thinking produced by this pedagogy would also change. Instead, 
reasoning could shift to a more conceptual or communicative 
method of reasoning, for example, by bringing together comparative 
and communicative analysis from different disciplinary perspectives, 
and by knowing how to use technology to achieve a usable result – a 
rolling process of reflexive thinking and collaborative rethinking.  
 
Relying on technology in a more radically decentred way, depending 
on technical devices to fill in the blanks in our minds and to connect 
knowledge in new ways, would change our understanding of 
knowledge, wisdom and intelligence itself. It would be a radical 
decentring in some ways, as the Humboldtian subject filled with 
culture and a certain notion of rationality would no longer exist; 
rather, the computational subject would know where to recall 
culture as and when it was needed in conjunction with 
computationally available others, a just-in-time cultural subject, 
perhaps, to feed into a certain form of connected computationally 
supported thinking through and visualised presentation. Rather than 
a method of thinking with eyes and hand, we would have a method 
of thinking with eyes and screen.8  
 
This doesn’t have to be dehumanising. Latour and others have 
rightly identified the domestication of the human mind that took 
place with pen and paper (Latour, 1986). This is because 
computers, like pen and paper, help to stabilise meaning by 
cascading and visualising encoded knowledge that allows it to be 
continually ‘drawn, written, [and] recoded’ (Latour, 1986: 16). 
Computational techniques could give us greater powers of thinking, 
larger reach for our imaginations, and, possibly, allow us to 
reconnect to political notions of equality and redistribution based 
on the potential of computation to give to each according to their 
need and to each according to their ability. This is the point made 
forcefully by Fuller (2010: 262), who argues that we should look 
critically at the potential for inequality which is created when new 
technologies are introduced into society. This is not merely a 
problem of a ‘digital divide’, but a more fundamental one of how we 
classify those that are more ‘human’ than others, when access to 
computation and information increasingly has to pass through the 
market.  
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Towards a digital humanities? 
 
The importance of understanding computational approaches is 
increasingly reflected across a number of disciplines, including the 
arts, humanities and social sciences, which use technologies to shift 
the critical ground of their concepts and theories – something that 
can be termed a computational turn.9 This is shown in the increasing 
interest in the digital humanities (Schreibman et al., 2008) and 
computational social science (Lazer et al., 2009), as evidenced, for 
example, by the growth in journals, conferences, books and research 
funding. In the digital humanities ‘critical inquiry involves the 
application of algorithmically facilitated search, retrieval, and critical 
process that… originat[es] in humanities-based work’; therefore 
‘exemplary tasks traditionally associated with humanities computing 
hold the digital representation of archival materials on a par with 
analysis or critical inquiry, as well as theories of analysis or critical 
inquiry originating in the study of those materials’ (Schreibman et 
al., 2008: xxv). In social sciences, Lazer et al. argue that 
‘computational social science is emerging that leverages the capacity 
to collect and analyze data with an unprecedented breadth and 
depth and scale’ (2009).  
 
Latour speculates that there is a trend in these informational 
cascades, which is certainly reflected in the ongoing digitalisation of 
arts, humanities and social science projects that tends towards ‘the 
direction of the greater merging of figures, numbers and letters, 
merging greatly facilitated by their homogenous treatment as binary 
units in and by computers’ (Latour, 1986: 16). The financial 
considerations are also new with these computational disciplines, as 
they require more money and organisation than the old individual 
scholar of lore did. Not only are the start-up costs correspondingly 
greater, usually needed to pay for the researchers, computer 
programmers, computer technology, software, digitisation costs, 
etc., but there are real questions about sustainability of digital 
projects, such as: ‘Who will pay to maintain the digital resources?’ 
‘Will the user forums, and user contributions, continue to be 
monitored and moderated if we can’t afford a staff member to do so? 
Will the wiki get locked down at the close of funding or will we leave 
it to its own devices, becoming an online-free-for all?’ (Terras, 
2010).10 It also raises a lot of new ethical questions for social 
scientists and humanists to grapple with. As argued in Nature, 
 
For a certain sort of social scientist, the traffic 
patterns of millions of e-mails look like manna 
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from heaven. Such data sets allow them to map 
formal and informal networks and pecking orders, 
to see how interactions affect an organization’s 
function, and to watch these elements evolve over 
time. They are emblematic of the vast amounts of 
structured information opening up new ways to 
study communities and societies. Such research 
could provide much-needed insight into some of 
the most pressing issues of our day, from the 
functioning of religious fundamentalism to the 
way behaviour influences epidemics… But for 
such research to flourish, it must engender that 
which it seeks to describe… Any data on human 
subjects inevitably raise privacy issues, and the 
real risks of abuse of such data are difficult to 
quantify, (Nature, 2007) 
 
For Latour, ‘sociology has been obsessed by the goal of becoming a 
quantitative science. Yet it has never been able to reach this goal 
because of what it has defined as being quantifiable within the social 
domain…’. Thus, he adds, ‘[i]t is indeed striking that at this very 
moment, the fast expanding fields of “data visualisation”, 
“computational social science” or “biological networks” are tracing, 
before our eyes, just the sort of data’ that sociologists such as Gabriel 
Tarde, at the turn of the 20th century, could merely speculate about 
(Latour, 2010: 116).  
 
Further, it is not merely the quantification of research which was 
traditionally qualitative that is offered with these approaches. 
Rather, as Unsworth argues, we should think of these computational 
‘tools as offering provocations, surfacing evidence, suggesting 
patterns and structures, or adumbrating trends’ (Unsworth, quoted 
in Clement et al., 2008). For example, the methods of ‘cultural 
analytics’ make it possible, through the use of quantitative 
computational techniques, to understand and follow large-scale 
cultural, social and political processes for research projects – that is, 
it offers massive amounts of literary or visual data analysis (see 
Manovich and Douglas, 2009). This is a distinction that Moretti 
(2007) referred to as distant versus close readings of texts. As he 
points out, the traditional humanities focuses on a ‘minimal fraction 
of the literary field’, 
 
A canon of two hundred novels, for instance, 
sounds very large for nineteenth-century Britain 
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(and is much larger than the current one), but is 
still less than one per cent of the novels that were 
actually published: twenty thousand, thirty, more, 
no one really knows -- and close reading won’t 
help here, a novel a day every day of the year 
would take a century or so... And it’s not even a 
matter of time, but of method: a field this large 
cannot be understood by stitching together 
separate bits of knowledge about individual cases, 
because it isn’t a sum of individual cases: it’s a 
collective system, that should be grasped as such, 
as a whole, (Moretti, 2007: 3-4) 
 
It is difficult for the traditional arts, humanities and social sciences to 
completely ignore the large-scale digitalisation effort going on 
around them, particularly when large quantities of research money 
are available to create archives, tools and methods in the digital 
humanities and computational social sciences. However, less 
understood is the way in which the digital archives being created are 
deeply computational in structure and content, because the 
computational logic is entangled with the digital representations of 
physical objects, texts and ‘born digital’ artefacts. Computational 
techniques are not merely an instrument wielded by traditional 
methods; rather they have profound effects on all aspects of the 
disciplines. Not only do they introduce new methods, which tend to 
focus on the identification of novel patterns in the data as against the 
principle of narrative and understanding, they also allow the 
modularisation and recombination of disciplines within the 
university itself.  
 
Computational approaches facilitate disciplinary hybridity that leads 
to a post-disciplinary university -- which can be deeply unsettling to 
traditional academic knowledge. Software allows for new ways of 
reading and writing. For example, this is what Tanya Clement says 
on the distant reading of Gertrude Stein’s The Making of Americans, 
 
The Making of Americans was criticized by [those] 
like Malcolm Cowley who said Stein’s 
‘experiments in grammar’ made this novel ‘one of 
the hardest books to read from beginning to end 
that has ever been published’.… The highly 
repetitive nature of the text, comprising almost 
900 pages and 3174 paragraphs with only 
approximately 5,000 unique words, makes 
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keeping tracks of lists of repetitive elements 
unmanageable and ultimately incomprehensible... 
[However] text mining allowed me to use 
statistical methods to chart repetition across 
thousands of paragraphs… facilitated my ability 
to read the results by allowing me to sort those 
results in different ways and view them within the 
context of the text. As a result, by visualizing 
clustered patterns across the text’s 900 pages of 
repetitions… [th]is discovery provides a new key 
for reading the text as a circular text with two 
corresponding halves, which substantiates and 
extends the critical perspective that Making is 
neither inchoate nor chaotic, but a highly 
systematic and controlled text. This perspective 
will change how scholars read and teach The 
Making of Americans. (Clement, quoted in 
Clement, Steger, Unsworth, and Uszkalo, 2008) 
 
I wouldn’t want to overplay the distinction between pattern and 
narrative as differing modes of analysis. Indeed, patterns implicitly 
require narrative in order to be understood, and it can be argued that 
code itself consists of a narrative form that allows databases, 
collections and archives to function at all. Nonetheless, pattern and 
narrative are useful analytic terms that enable us to see the way in 
which the computational turn is changing the nature of knowledge 
in the university and, with it, the kind of computational subject that 
the university is beginning to produce. As Bruce Sterling argues, 
 
‘Humanistic heavy iron’: it’s taken a long time for 
the humanities to get into super computing, and 
into massive database management. They are 
really starting to get there now. You are going to 
get into a situation where even English professors 
are able to study every word ever written about, or 
for, or because of, Charles Dickens or Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning. That’s just a different way to 
approach the literary corpus. I think there is a lot 
of potential there. (Sterling, 2010) 
 
Indeed, there is a cultural dimension to this process and, as we 
become more used to computational visualisations, we will expect to 
see them and use them with confidence and fluency. The 
computational subject is a key requirement for a data-centric age, 
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certainly when we begin to look at case studies that demonstrate 
how important a computational comportment can be in order to 
perform certain forms of public and private activities in a world that 
is increasingly pervaded by computational devices. In short, Bildung 
is still a key idea in the digital university, not as a subject trained in a 
vocational fashion to perform instrumental labour, nor as a subject 
skilled in a national literary culture, but rather as a subject which can 
unify the information that society is now producing at increasing 
rates, and which understands new methods and practices of critical 
reading (code, data visualisation, patterns, narrative) and is open to 
new methods of pedagogy to facilitate it. Indeed, Presner (2010) 
argues that the digital humanities 
 
must be engaged with the broad horizon of 
possibilities for building upon excellence in the 
humanities while also transforming our research 
culture, our curriculum, our departmental and 
disciplinary structures, our tenure and promotion 
standards, and, most of all, the media and format 
of our scholarly publications. (Presner, 2010: 6) 
 
This is a subject that is highly computationally communicative, and 
that is also able to access, process and visualise information and 
results quickly and effectively. At all levels of society, people will 
increasingly have to turn data and information into usable 
computational forms in order to understand it at all. For example, 
one could imagine a form of computational journalism that enables 
the public sphere function of the media to make sense of the large 
amount of data which governments, amongst others, are generating, 
perhaps through increasing use of ‘charticles’, or journalistic articles 
that combine text, image, video, computational applications and 
interactivity (Stickney, 2008). This is a form of ‘networked’ 
journalism that ‘becomes a non-linear, multi- dimensional process’ 
(Beckett, 2008: 65). Additionally, for people in everyday life who 
need the skills that enable them to negotiate an increasingly 
computational field – one need only think of the amount of data in 
regard to managing personal money, music, film, text, news, email, 
pensions, etc. – there will be calls for new skills of financial and 
technical literacy, or, more generally, a computational literacy or 
computational pedagogy that the digital humanities could contribute 
to.  
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Humanity and the humanities 
 
As the advantages of the computational approach to research (and 
teaching) become persuasive to the positive sciences, whether 
history, biology, literature or any other discipline, the ontological 
notion of the entities they study begins to be transformed. These 
disciplines thus become focused on the computationality of the 
entities in their work.11 Here, following Heidegger, I want to argue 
that there remains a location for the possibility of philosophy to 
explicitly question the ontological understanding of what the 
computational is in regard to these positive sciences. 
Computationality might then be understood as an ontotheology, 
creating a new ontological ‘epoch’ as a new historical constellation 
of intelligibility. The digital humanists could therefore orient 
themselves to questions raised when computationality is itself 
problematized in this way (see Liu 2011). 
 
With the notion of ontotheology, Heidegger is following Kant’s 
argument that intelligibility is a process of filtering and organising a 
complex overwhelming world by the use of ‘categories’, Kant’s 
‘discursivity thesis’. Heidegger historicizes Kant’s cognitive 
categories by arguing that there is ‘succession of changing historical 
ontotheologies that make up the “core” of the metaphysical 
tradition. These ontotheologies establish “the truth concerning 
entities as such and as a whole”, in other words, they tell us both 
what and how entities are – establishing both their essence and their 
existence’ (Thomson, 2009: 149-150). Metaphysics, grasped 
ontotheologically, ‘temporarily secures the intelligible order’ by 
understanding it ‘ontologically’, from the inside out, and 
‘theologically’, from the outside in, which allows the formation of an 
epoch, a ‘historical constellation of intelligibility which is unified 
around its ontotheological understanding of the being of entities’ 
(Thomson, 2009: 150). As Thomson argues: 
 
The positive sciences all study classes of 
entities… Heidegger… [therefore] refers to the 
positive sciences as ‘ontic sciences’. Philosophy, 
on the other hand, studies the being of those 
classes of entities, making philosophy an 
‘ontological science’ or, more grandly, a ‘science 
of being’ (Thomson 2003: 529). 
 
Philosophy as a field of inquiry, one might argue, should have its ‘eye 
on the whole’, and it is this focus on ‘the landscape as a whole’ which 
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distinguishes the philosophical enterprise and which can be 
extremely useful in trying to understand these ontotheological 
developments (Sellars, 1962: 36). If code and software are to 
become objects of research for the humanities and social sciences, 
including philosophy, we will need to grasp both the ontic and 
ontological dimensions of computer code. Broadly speaking, then, 
this paper suggests that we take a philosophical approach to the 
subject of computer code, paying attention to the wider aspects of 
code and software, and connecting them to the materiality of this 
growing digital world. With this in mind, the question of code 
becomes central to understanding in the digital humanities, and 
serves as a condition of possibility for the many computational 
forms that mediate out experience of contemporary culture and 
society. 
 
 
 
 
Endotes 
 
1 HTML is the HyperText Markup Language used to encode 
webpages. AJAX is shorthand for Asynchronous JavaScript and 
XML, which is a collection of client side technologies that enable an 
interactive and audio-visual dynamic web. 
 
2 I am indebted to Alan Finlayson for his comments on this section. 
 
3 For example in The Idea of a University (Newman, 1996) and 
Culture and Anarchy (Arnold, 2009). 
 
4 See http://www.bcs.org/server.php?show=nav.5829 
 
5 What Heidegger calls ‘the Danger’ (die Gefahr) is the idea that a 
particular ontotheology should become permanent, particularly the 
ontotheology associated with technology and enframing (see 
Heidegger 1993). 
 
6 See Thomson (2003: 531) for a discussion of how Heidegger 
understood this to be the role of philosophy. 
 
7 Kirschenbaum argues:  
 
I believe such trends will eventually affect the 
minutiae of academic policy. The English 
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department where I teach, like most which offer 
the doctorate, requires students to demonstrate 
proficiency in at least one foreign language. 
Should a graduate student be allowed to 
substitute demonstrated proficiency in a 
computer-programming language instead? Such 
questions have recently arisen in my department 
and elsewhere; in my own case, almost a decade 
ago, I was granted permission to use the computer 
language Perl in lieu of proficiency in the second 
of two languages that my department required for 
the Ph.D. I successfully made the case that given 
my interest in the digital humanities, this was far 
more practical than revisiting my high-school 
Spanish. (Kirschenbaum 2009, emphasis added)  
 
8 This does not preclude other more revolutionary human-computer 
interfaces that are under development, including haptic interfaces, 
eye control interfaces, or even brain-wave controlled software 
interfaces.  
 
9 See http://www.thecomputationalturn.com/ 
 
10 See the open digital humanities translation of Plato’s Protagoras 
for a good example of a wiki-based project, 
http://openprotagoras.wikidot.com/ 
 
11 Here I don’t have the space to explore the possibilities of a 
transformation of the distinction between research and teaching by 
digital technologies, themselves a result of the Humboldtian notion 
of the university. We might consider that a new hybridized form of 
research-teaching or teaching-research might emerge, driven, in 
part, by the possibility of new knowledges being created and 
discovered within the teaching process itself. This would mean that 
the old distinctions of research as creative, and teaching as 
dissemination would have to change too. 
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